Paraskevas V. Lekeas, Giorgos Stamatopoulos. Cooperative oligopoly games: a probabilistic approach
Submitted on: Aug 23, 2012, 20:13:40
Natural Sciences / Computer Science / Mathematical logic
Description: We analyze the core of a cooperative Cournot game. We assume that when contemplating a deviation, the members of a coalition assign positive probability over all possible coalition structures that the non-members can form. We show that when the number of firms in the market is sufficiently large then the core of the underlying cooperative game is non-empty. Moreover, we show that the core of our game is a subset of the gamma - core.
The abstract of this article will be published in the August 2012 issue of "Intellectual Archive Bulletin", ISSN 1929-1329.
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